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CVE-2026-123007 (nginx2root): Critical nginx HTTP/2 Vulnerability Allows Unauthenticated Remote Attacks

19 November 2026

A flaw in the HTTP/2 handling of nginx (CVE-2026-123007) allows an attacker to corrupt server memory remotely and without credentials, and possibly execute code. Update today. If you cannot yet, turn off HTTP/2 until your distribution releases the fix.

On 18 November a patch was released for CVE-2026-123007, which the company Xint calls "nginx2root". This vulnerability in nginx allows an attacker to corrupt server memory remotely and without credentials and, according to its discoverers, to execute code. No fixed package is available yet for Debian and Red Hat.

Our advice in four points

Update today. If you cannot yet, turn off HTTP/2 until your distribution releases the fix.

  • Decide the order. Start with nginx servers that are reachable from the internet and use HTTP/2, including those in Kubernetes and appliances.
  • Turn off HTTP/2. Set http2 off; and remove http2 from every listen on the port. Reload and check that h2 is no longer offered.
  • Update and restart. Install nginx 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, or the fixed package from your distribution. A reload does not replace the binary.
  • Block SCTP. Do this on hosts that do not use SCTP. There is no patch yet for the kernel flaw.

If you do not know which version an nginx instance runs, treat that server as vulnerable.

What is going on: vulnerable as soon as HTTP/2 is on

  • This concerns CVE-2026-123007. Xint also describes an as yet unpatched flaw in the Linux kernel that lets an attacker gain root privileges from nginx. Four other flaws in nginx are unrelated.
  • Severity: critical. F5 rates it 9.2 under CVSS 4.0 and 8.1 under CVSS 3.1. To execute code, an attacker has to bypass ASLR. The researchers describe how this can be done.
  • Affected are nginx 1.9.5 up to and including 1.31.8 and NGINX Plus, including distribution packages, container images, Kubernetes ingress controllers and derivatives such as OpenResty and Tengine.
  • Condition: HTTP/2 is enabled and reachable. This is not a default setting, so check every server.
  • With this vulnerability alone, an attacker can crash worker processes or, with the full exploit, execute code. The attacker then has access to the TLS keys, the traffic passing through the proxy and the credentials for the back ends. Combined with the kernel flaw, this gives root privileges on the host, even from within a Docker container.
  • No exploitation is known. The Rapid7 exploit only works under controlled conditions, but it proves that the flaw can be exploited.

Where is nginx? In more places than you think

Also check nginx in third-party products and services.

  • Your own servers and proxies: websites, APIs and load balancers.
  • Kubernetes: ingress-nginx has HTTP/2 enabled. The project has been archived and will not receive a patch (Upwind).
  • Containers and derivatives: Docker images, OpenResty, Tengine and Angie.
  • Third-party systems: appliances and managed services that include nginx.

The four other nginx2root vulnerabilities are unrelated to this flaw. They can only be exploited with a specific configuration: HTTP/3, a resolver with mirror or SSI, or the mail proxy. See the overview under "For your security team".

Action plan: what to do now

Carry out steps 1 to 4 today. Steps 5 to 7 follow within 72 hours.

Today: inventory and shield

1. Find out where nginx runs. Run nginx -v. For distribution packages, compare the package version with your distribution's advisory:

  • dpkg -l 'nginx*' (Debian and Ubuntu) or rpm -q nginx (Red Hat)

2. Check whether HTTP/2 is on.

  • On the server: sudo nginx -T 2>&1 | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE 'listen[[:space:]].*http2|^[[:space:]]*http2[[:space:]]+on[[:space:]]*;'
  • From outside your network: openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -E 'ALPN protocol|No ALPN'
  • h2 means exposed. No output means the connection failed.
  • Behind a CDN: repeat the test against the origin.

3. Update or turn off HTTP/2. If you use packages from nginx.org, the official Docker image or Ubuntu, update now. Otherwise, turn off HTTP/2:

  • From 1.25.1: http2 off; and remove http2 from every listen on the port. Older versions: remove http2 from listen.
  • Reload the configuration. Restart nginx if workers remain in the "shutting down" state.
  • ingress-nginx: use-http2: "false".

Note: without HTTP/2, native gRPC no longer works.

4. Cannot turn off HTTP/2? Then shield the server. Restrict access by IP address or place the server behind a CDN or layer 7 load balancer, without direct access to the origin. This reduces the risk but does not remove it.

Within 72 hours: patch and verify

5. Update and restart. Install the fixed version and restart. A reload is not enough. Only turn HTTP/2 back on afterwards. Status as of 19 November 2026:

  • nginx Open Source: fixed in 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline). Packages from nginx.org and the official Docker image are available.
  • NGINX Plus: fixed in 37.3.0.1 and 37.0.8.1. R33 to R36 will not receive a fix.
  • Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL: Ubuntu is fixed (USN-9159-1). Debian 12 and 13 and RHEL 8 to 10 are vulnerable and do not yet have a fixed package.
  • Kubernetes: NGINX Ingress Controller 5.8.0 and Gateway Fabric 2.9.0 are fixed. ingress-nginx will not receive a patch. Move to an alternative.

6. Block SCTP. Use lsmod | grep sctp to check that SCTP is not in use. Then, on the host and not in the container, put install sctp /bin/false in /etc/modprobe.d/. A module that is already loaded remains active. The rule also has no effect if SCTP is built into the kernel.

7. Check for exploitation. Watch for these signs:

  • A TLS connection with tens of GB inbound and almost nothing outbound. This does not appear in the access log.
  • Worker crashes (signal 11 in error.log).
  • Any process started by an nginx worker. This is the clearest sign of successful exploitation.

If you find traces, isolate and investigate the entire host, as the attacker may have root privileges. Also replace the TLS certificates and the credentials for the back ends. Call in incident response if needed.

Ongoing: heightened vigilance

  • Have your SOC or MDR provider monitor these signs until every nginx instance is updated.
  • Stay alert over the coming days. According to VulnCheck, the previous serious nginx flaw (CVE-2026-42945) was exploited a few days after the patch.

Frequently asked questions

Is a reload enough? No. A new configuration only applies to new connections. The patch requires a restart or a binary upgrade (USR2).

We run Debian or Red Hat. What now? There is no fixed package yet. Turn off HTTP/2 until your distribution releases the fix.

Are we already under attack? No exploitation is known. The public exploit only works under controlled conditions and needs around 128 GB of traffic. Xint and Wiz have exploits they have not published.

For your security team: the technical details

This is an integer overflow in the HTTP/2 flow control of nginx (ngx_http_v2_module). When a stream is cancelled, ngx_http_v2_filter_cleanup() returns credit to send_window without checking the maximum. The window value then overflows and memcpy() is called in the TLS path with an enormous length. The result is an address leak and an out-of-bounds write.

  • There is no short trigger. After roughly 52 GiB of WINDOW_UPDATE frames on a single TLS connection, the window becomes negative. After roughly 60 GB a worker crashes, and code execution requires around 128 GB. That volume is the best way to recognise an attack.
  • For detection, run sudo ss -tinp state established '( sport = :443 )' twice and compare bytes_received. Use auditd to log every execve by the nginx user.

The other CVEs, with condition and measure:

  • CVE-2026-123633: HTTP/2, proxying to a back end and almost no free connections. Turning off HTTP/2 helps. Measure: turn off HTTP/2.
  • CVE-2026-123634: resolver, proxy_pass with a variable, mirror or SSI. Turning off HTTP/2 does not help. Measure: proxy_pass to a fixed upstream group.
  • CVE-2026-121810: HTTP/3, proxying to a back end. Turning off HTTP/2 does not help. Measure: remove listen … quic, set http3 off; and Alt-Svc 'clear'.
  • CVE-2026-113425: mail, proxy on, auth_http. Turning off HTTP/2 does not help. Measure: listen on loopback only or filter by IP address.

Sources: nginx.org/en/security_advisories.html, F5 K000163926, Xint (xint.io/blog/nginx2root-remote-code-execution), Rapid7, Upwind and VulnCheck.

How DEFION helps

We search for traces of exploitation with managed detection and response and carry out forensic investigation with DFIR if we find any. We also use Security Control Validation to test whether your WAF, EDR or SIEM detects the public trigger. Follow current threats on our threat intelligence page.

Questions or need help? Contact your usual DEFION contact, call our main number +31 88 733 13 37 or get in touch through our website.

Download the full advisory as a PDF (5 pages, in Dutch).

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